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The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We 
study a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank’s decision to liquidate bad 
firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. 
Second, it loses the rent from incumbent customers that is due to its informational advantage. 
We show that institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium in 
which the optimal number of firms is liquidated. There is also a range where improving 
institutions may decrease the number of bad firms liquidated. 
JEL Code: D82, G21, G33, K10. 
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Bankruptcy is an important mechanism for ineﬃcient ﬁrms to exit the market and
this threat provides important incentives ex ante. During the recent economic
stagnation, the number of corporate bankruptcies reached a new all time high
in Western Europe. In contrast, the number of bankruptcies remained very low
in Eastern Europe throughout the 1990s when the region was plagued by the
transition recession (Linne, 2001).1 Deﬁcient institutions contribute to the low
number of corporate bankruptcy in transition economies. A cross-country study
has shown that the number of bankruptcies increases as judicial eﬃciency increases
(Claessens and Klapper, 2002). The following questions arise when one wants to
explain the empirical facts: How do institutions inﬂuence the incentive of creditors
to liquidate defaulting debtors? Which are the institutions that matter for this
decision? To answer these questions, we have to clarify the economic eﬀects of
bankruptcy. First, it is supposed to create a return for the lenders; second, “ [...]
bankruptcy information is publicly disseminated to alert present creditors and
potential lenders” (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002, p. 2028).
In this paper we study both eﬀects of bankruptcy. For our analysis, we set
up a model of bank-ﬁrm relationship in order to study the incentive of a bank to
liquidate its defaulting customers. The banking sector consists of two banks that
compete in Bertrand fashion and that have diﬀerent market shares. The ﬁrms
asking for credit are either so-called “new ﬁrms” without a credit history or so-
called “old ﬁrms” that have received credit in the past. Only the incumbent bank
knows the quality of the old ﬁrms; thus, it has superior information compared
to the outside bank. As the banks cannot eﬃciently screen the ﬁrms applying
for credit, the repayment they require for making zero expected proﬁtd e p e n d s
on the average quality of borrowers applying for credit at this bank for the ﬁrst
time. In equilibrium, the good old ﬁrms stay with the incumbent bank and the
bad old ﬁrms switch the bank. As the good old ﬁrms cannot signal their type to
an outside bank, the incumbent bank demands the same repayment as an outside
bank. This is a typical hold-up problem.
1This exceptional recession was characterized by a tremendous decline of GDP, which has
reached 50 per cent in some countries. The reason for the transition recession was the systemic
change taking place in these countries. The systemic change was accompanied by a vacuum in
institutions because the institutions for the planned economy have no longer been appropriate
for economic interactions and institutions for market transactions have been in the process of
developing.
2The incumbent bank decides whether to accept that bad old ﬁrms postpone
their repayments ﬁrm or to liquidate the ﬁrm. In making this decision, there is
at r a d eo ﬀ between two diﬀerent eﬀects. If the ﬁrm’s assets are liquidated, the
bank receives a liquidation payoﬀ.I ft h eﬁrm is not liquidated, it will reapply for
credit at an outside bank. As more bad old ﬁrms apply for credit, the repayment
which an outside bank needs to break even increases. Due to the hold-up problem
w h i c he a c hg o o do l dﬁrm faces, the incumbent bank can extract rents from its
incumbent customers. The rent extracted decreases as the number of ﬁrms liqui-
dated increases. The better the legal institutions are, the higher is the payoﬀ in
the case of liquidation. However, improving the institutions does not necessarily
increase the number of ﬁrms liquidated. Since the decision of each bank depends
on the decision of its competitor, multiple equilibria occur. In one equilibrium,
it takes signiﬁcant improvements until the number of ﬁrms liquidated increases
and reaches the optimal level. In the other equilibrium, the initial increase in the
number of liquidated ﬁrms is reversed if institutions further improve. Although
some setback with respect to the number of ﬁrms liquidated is possible, our analy-
sis shows that a continuation of reforms in the end yields an eﬃcient liquidation
decision.
This paper is related to three area in the literature: interdependence between
law and ﬁnance, creditor passivity and information exchange through credit bu-
reaus. The superordinated research question is the interdependence between law
and ﬁnance. There is a growing body of literature that asserts a positive inﬂu-
ence of creditor protection on the development of credit markets (La Porta et al.,
1998).2 One important aspect of credit rights is corporate bankruptcy. Similar
to all creditor rights, the eﬀectiveness of bankruptcy, which determines the payoﬀ
a creditor receives, is inﬂuenced by both the law in the books and its enforce-
ment. Claessens and Klapper (2002) show that the number of bankruptcies is
higher the better the institutions are. However, they also ﬁnd that in combina-
tion with stronger creditor rights greater judicial eﬃciency leads to fewer cases
of bankruptcy. In the theoretical literature, the eﬀect of formal bankruptcy rules
on ex ante and ex post incentives have been studied intensively (for a discussion
see Stiglitz, 2001). In addition, the relationship between bankruptcy codes and
the capital structure of ﬁrms has been investigated in several papers, for instance,
Berglöf et al., 2002. We do not restrict attention to formal rules but to all factors
that inﬂuence the payoﬀ for the creditor. This payoﬀ can be reduced because
2Jappelli et al. (2002) show that credit is less widely available in Italian provinces that have
longer trials or larger backlogs of pending trials.
3the rules are formulated ambiguously, the legal system works ineﬃciently or the
secondary markets are not functioning very well. As a consequence, the incentive
of a creditor to declare a ﬁrm bankrupt decreases as institutions deteriorate.
Two explanations are given in the literature for this phenomenon of creditor
passivity. First, if banks are poorly capitalized, they are gambling by rolling
over debts to defaulting customers if there is a chance they would repay (Perotti,
1993). Second, it is argued that banks are reluctant to liquidate ﬁrms because
they do not want to provide information on the share of non-performing loans in
their portfolio (Aghion et al., 1999; Mitchell, 2001).3 In the latter two papers,
asymmetric information between the bank and the regulator only matters if the
policy decision of bank recapitalization is considered. However, in our model, the
resulting adverse selection problem has an important impact on the bank’s daily
business, namely, the decision to liquidate ineﬃcient ﬁrms.
As information about incumbent customers is disseminated by both bank-
ruptcy and credit registers, they can be seen as substitutes.4 Generally, informa-
tion can either be on the borrower’s type or the performance in the past, such as
the project outcome or default. The exchange of information about borrower type
through private credit registers is studied by Pagano and Jappelli (1993). In the
basic setup, the banks, which are local monopolies, beneﬁtf r o ma ni n f o r m a t i o n
exchange through declining default rates. Introducing bank competition makes
information sharing less likely because it reduces the informational rent a bank
can extract. Padilla and Pagano (1997) use a slightly diﬀerent setup where banks
also generate rents from high quality borrowers in the ﬁrst period of a two-period
lending relationship. In this setup, the bank has an incentive to reveal information
about the ﬁrm’s type after the ﬁrst period. The reason is that banks compete more
ﬁercely in the case of information sharing. Thus, the ﬁrm gets a higher return
and, therefore, it has a better incentive to exert eﬀort. This increases its quality
and thereby the rent a bank extracts in the ﬁrst period rises. In a companion
paper, Padilla and Pagano (2000) study the case where rents are competed away
ex ante. In that case, it is better to show information only about the outcome of
ap r o j e c tb e c a u s et h eﬁrm’s incentive to work hard is thereby the biggest. The
extent to which information is revealed about its customers can also be used by
3For example, if the manager shows that his bank has accumulated a huge proportion of bad
debts, he faces the threat of being replaced by the supervisory body, which wants to recapitalize
the banking system (Aghion et al., 1999).
4Therefore, it is not too surprising that credit risk is lower and bank lending is higher in
countries that have credit registers (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002).
4a bank to deter entry (Boukaert and Degryse, 2002). For intermediate degrees of
adverse selection, the incumbent bank can limit the scope of entry by revealing
the outcome of the ﬁrst period, but not the type of the ﬁrm.5
So far, the literature on relationship banking and the resulting adverse selection
problem has not addressed the role of corporate bankruptcy. Like information
provided by a private credit bureau, the fact that a ﬁrm has to ﬁle for bankruptcy
reveals that a ﬁrm is unsuccessful. This fact becomes public information. In our
model, the decision on bankruptcy reveals the borrower’s type. In contrast to
displaying information to a credit bureau, the bank’s decision to let a ﬁrm go
bankrupt yields a payoﬀ to the bank. Therefore, our model explains why even
competitive banks have an incentive to display information about their borrower’s
type. In contrast to most papers in this area, the banks do not face a commitment
problem concerning the display of information.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we ﬁrst develop the credit
market game and study the impact of corporate bankruptcy on interest rates.
I ns e c t i o n3 ,w ea n a l y z et h eb a n k ’ si n c e n t i v et ol i q u i d a t ead e f a u l t i n gb o r r o w e r .
Comparative statics allows us to show how institutions inﬂuence the bank’s deci-




To capture the speciﬁc relationship between ﬁrms and banks, we use a two-period
model. The setup of our credit market model is similar to that of Dell’Ariccia
et al. (1999). Before starting the analysis, we describe the characteristics of the
borrowers and the banking sector.
In the ﬁrst period, the old ﬁrms receive a loan in the amount of I1 and thereby
establish a bank-ﬁrm relationship in which the incumbent bank learns their type.
In the second period, the ﬁrms want to ﬁnance an indivisible investment project.
Therefore, they need credit in the amount of I2 because they do not have their
own liquid funds. There are two diﬀerent groups of ﬁrms. First, there are the so-
called old customers, which have already established a bank-ﬁrm relationship in
5In this case, the entrant bank poaches borrowers which were successful in the ﬁrst period.
But it is not attractive to ﬁnance the unsuccessful ﬁrms, which can but not necessarily will be
successful.
5the ﬁrst period. Second, there are so-called new customers, which seek to establish
ab a n k - ﬁrm relationship for the ﬁr s tt i m e .T h en u m b e ro fﬁr m si sn o r m a l i z e dt o
1; the share of old customers is µ and those of new customers is (1 − µ).6 All
old customers default on the loans, which they have received in the ﬁrst period
from the incumbent bank.7 This bank is their only creditor. However, in the
second period, only a proportion p of them will be successful, generating a return
of X. These are the good old customers; they could be thought of as late-starters
which need some additional ﬁnance in the second period to complete a project
successfully. We assume that the second period repayment X is high enough to
cover all investments made, i.e. X>I 1 + I2.T h u s ,i ti so p t i m a lt or e ﬁnance the
good old ﬁrms. Among the old customers a proportion of (1 − p) will fail in the
second period, they are called “bad old customers”. Only the incumbent bank
can observe the risk type of the old ﬁrms before the second period starts. If a
bad old ﬁrm manages to receive credit from an outside bank, it invests the credit
ineﬃciently. Hence, the bad old ﬁrm cannot repay the incumbent bank although
it is reﬁnanced by the outside bank.
No bank has information on the risk type of the new ﬁrms. It is, however,
common knowledge that there is a probability q they will be successful. In the
case of success, a new ﬁrm generates a payoﬀ X. It is socially optimal to ﬁnance
new ﬁrms as qX ≥ I2. For notational convenience I2 is denoted by I in the
following analysis.
The ﬁrms are endowed with assets of A.A f t e rp e r i o d1, the incumbent bank
decides about forcing defaulting customers to undergo a bankruptcy procedure.
We assume that the bank cannot be forced by law to initiate a bankruptcy pro-
cedure if it knows that a ﬁrm will not be successful in the future.8 We do not
model the diﬀerent routes taken in a bankruptcy procedure, i.e. liquidation or
reorganization, but assume that a ﬁrm is liquidated. If a ﬁrm is liquidated, it
becomes common knowledge that it is a bad ﬁrm. The liquidation value is de-
noted by αA. The liquidation value of one unit of asset is determined by the
quality of secondary markets and the costs of enforcing contracts, captured by
the assumption that α < 1. The liquidation value increases as the quality of the
institutions, such as the legal framework, improves. By the end of period 2,t h e
6Through this assumption we focus our analysis on theose ﬁrms that have an incentive to
announce being a new ﬁrm.
7Old ﬁrms that have a project with a positive return could signal their type to an outside
bank and do not face the hold-up problem described here.
8Instead, a bank can, for instance, decide to simply write oﬀ the outstanding loan.
6assets become worthless. We assume that the proceeds from liquidation do not
cover the amount of credit granted in the ﬁrst period, i.e. αA<I 1 and that the
liquidation is socially optimal because the loss of liquidation is lower than the
misallocation of capital in the second period, i.e. (1 − α)A<I.
The banking sector consists of two banks. Bank 1 has a market share in the
credit market of s1,b a n k2 of s2 (= 1 − s1), where we assume that 2
3 >s 1 >s 2.9
T h e r ei sn oe n t r ya n dn oe x i ta tt h eb e g i n n i n go fp e r i o d2. The costs of raising
funds is normalized to zero. With regards to the distribution of information, we
assume that the incumbent bank can observe the type of its old ﬁrms. Moreover,
the banks cannot screen the credit applicants eﬃciently and cannot distinguish
whether a ﬁrm has received credit before, i.e. they cannot discriminate between
old and new customers. As a consequence, they oﬀer a pooling contract. We
assume that ﬁrms apply for credit at each bank in proportion to their share in
the total population. Moreover, we assume that bank 2 has an incentive to lend
because the return generated by new ﬁrms is high enough to cover the losses made
with bad old customers, i.e. (qX − I)(1− µ) >µ s 1I (1 − p).
T h et i m i n go fe v e n t si sa sf o l l o w s :A tt h ee n do ft h eﬁrst period, the incumbent
bank decides about liquidating defaulting customers. Credit is granted in the
beginning of the second period. We assume that banks have two sequential moves.
First, they simultaneously choose the repayment for new applicants. Second, they
determine repayment by their old customers. Finally, ﬁrms demand credit from
the bank with the best credit oﬀer. We assume that an old customer continues to
lend from the incumbent bank if it is indiﬀerent between the oﬀers of incumbent
and outside banks. Old customers that are not staying with their incumbent bank
and new customers apply at the bank which oﬀers the lowest repayment. If both
banks oﬀer the same repayment, the market is tied between the two banks.
The time structure is summarized in the following ﬁgure:
2.2. Credit Contract
The game is solved by backward induction. In this section, we describe the credit
contract if neither bank liquidates its bad old customers. Good old ﬁrms always
stay with their incumbent bank. Therefore, we ﬁrst characterize the repayment
made by the ﬁrms that apply at an outside bank in the second period, which we
9The market shares of bank 1 and bank 2 diﬀer from each other in order to facilitate deriving
the repayment. The market share of the bigger bank, bank 1, is bound above because we want
to exclude that it monopolizes the market.
7Figure 2.1: Time line
will call, like Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999), “free market”. As the incumbent bank
demands the same repayment as the outside bank, good old ﬁrms stay with their
incumbent bank; they pay as much as the ﬁrms that switch their bank or apply
for credit for the ﬁrst time. In the free market, an equilibrium in pure strategies
does not exist. Banks decide about the repayment R, the cumulative distribution
function Fi, i =1 ,2, and the probability of denying credit prob(D).P r o p o s i t i o n
1 shows the equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Proposition 1. The mixed strategy equilibrium in period 2 has the following
features:




, according to the following cumulative distribution func-
tion F1 (R)=1−
µs1(1−p)





and prob(R1 = X)=
µs1(1−p)
(1−µ)(qX−I)I.














.I td o e sn o tm a k ea no ﬀer with probability prob(D)=
µs1(1−p)
(1−µ)(qX−I)I.
8Proof: See the Appendix.
When oﬀering the terms of a credit contract, the outside bank makes the ﬁrst
m o v e . T h ei n c u m b e n tb a n ka l w a y sh a st h ec h a n c et oo ﬀer a credit contract to
a good old customer that is as favorable as the one oﬀered by the outside bank.
Thus, in equilibrium, the good old customers stay with their incumbent bank and
repay as much as all other customers. The banks oﬀer a pooling contract for the
remaining customers, namely the bad old ﬁr m sa n dt h en e wﬁrms, because they
cannot discriminate between them.
However, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies for the repayment terms.
In equilibrium, the banks mix continuously on the range [R,X) or do not bid at
a l l . T h el o w e s tr e p a y m e n tR is determined by the condition that the expected
proﬁto fb a n k2, which has had a lower market share in the previous period, is
zero. Due to the resulting informational disadvantage compared to bank 1,b a n k
2 stays out of the market with positive probability and, therefore, makes zero
expected proﬁt from the newly applying customers. Bank 1 makes an expected
proﬁto fIµ(1 − p)(s1 − s2) from new applicants for credit in period 2.T h ep r o ﬁt
i sb a s e do nb a n k1’s informational advantage on old ﬁrms compared to bank 2
(Dell’Ariccia et al., 1999). Therefore, there exists an adverse selection problem
between banks.
The incumbent bank can extract a rent from all its good old customers. The
rent is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Each bank ﬁnances its good old customers and extracts from












Proof: See the Appendix.
The good old customers face a hold-up problem because they cannot signal
their type to an outside bank. Therefore, the incumbent bank extracts some rent
from each of these ﬁrms. A comparative static analysis provides some important
insights on the composition of the rents. The rent to be extracted is the higher,
the higher the market share of bank 1, s1, is. The adverse selection problem
between the two banks increases since bank 1 releases more bad old ﬁrms into the
pool of borrowers that then apply at an outside bank in period 2. Therefore, the
expected repayment increases because bank 2 puts a higher probability on higher
repayments and denies credit with a higher probability. If bank 2 denies credit,
9the incumbent bank 1 can extract the whole payoﬀ generated by the investment,
X, from its good old customers.
The share of bad old ﬁrms decreases if the share p of good old ﬁrms increases.
Thus, the quality of ﬁrms applying at an outside bank in the second period in-
creases. As a result, the severeness of the adverse selection problem decreases,
and therefore, the average repayment paid at an outside bank decreases. This
reduces the hold-up problem that good old ﬁrms face. Finally, the distribution of
new customers matters. The higher the proportion of good new ﬁrms, i.e. q,t h e
lower the repayment. The intuition is equivalent to a change in the make-up of
the population of old ﬁrms.
The discussion so far has shown that the size of the rent depends on the degree
of adverse selection between the two banks. We have assumed that banks do not
perform any screening and that they are not able to distinguish between old and
new ﬁrms.10 Clearly, the degree of adverse selection between banks decreases
if information about applying ﬁrms can be generated, be it through screening or
through credit registers. However, as long as information is imperfect, the adverse
selection problem will remain.
3. Incentive of Banks to Liquidate Defaulting Firms
In the analysis so far, we have not explicitly modelled the decision of a bank to
liquidate its bad old customers. Before deriving the optimal liquidation decision,
it is important to remember that the decision to liquidate reduces the degree of
asymmetric information between banks. We model the liquidation decision by
introducing a new variable ˆ si that measures the outﬂow of bad old ﬁrms from the
incumbent bank i to the outside bank. ˆ si is deﬁned as follows:
ˆ si =0 if bank i liquidates the bad old ﬁrms in its portfolio
= si if bank i does not liquidate the bad old ﬁrms in its portfolio
T h ed e g r e eo fa s y m m e t r i ci n f o r m a t i o ni n ﬂuences the rent extracted from the in-
cumbent customers. If bank 1 does not liquidate its bad old customers, the











(1−µ)q I, which for simplicity is denoted by ΠGO (s1,s 2 =0 ) .
10If the result of the screening process is very poor, it might be optimal not to invest into
costly screening (Schnitzer, 1999).
10This rent is independent of the decision of bank 2, because the amount of the rent
is determined by the market share of the bigger bank, i.e. bank 1. In the case that












which for simplicity is denoted by ΠGO (s1 =0 ,s 2).
Moreover, the degree of adverse selection also inﬂuences the proﬁt generated
in the free market. If no bank liquidates, only bank 1 makes a total proﬁto f
Iµ(1 − p)(s1 − s2),d e n o t e db yΠFM(s1,s 2).I f b a n k 1 liquidates but bank 2
does not, bank 2 gets a payoﬀ of Iµ(1 − p)s2,d e n o t e db yΠFM(s1 =0 ,s 2).I f
both banks liquidate, both make zero expected proﬁt from the free market.
Taking the eﬀect of liquidation on the adverse selection problem between banks
into account, a bank decides to liquidate its customers, which yields a payoﬀ of
αA per customer, if
µsi (1 − p)αA + µsipΠ
GO (si =0 ,s j ≥ 0) + Π
FM(si =0 ,s j ≥ 0)
≥ µsipΠ
GO (si > 0,s j ≥ 0) + Π
FM(si > 0,s j ≥ 0)
This comparison shows that the optimal decision of each bank depends on the
liquidation decision of its competitor. Each bank faces the following trade-oﬀ.O n
the one hand, it gains the liquidation payoﬀ. On the other hand, it may lose some
rent because its relative position (in terms of the number of ﬁrms it has positive
information about) changes. The rent is lost through two eﬀects. First, the bank
loses the proﬁt which it could have made with newly applying ﬁrms in the second
period because it would have had a higher market share. Assume that bank 2
has liquidated its bad old ﬁrms. Now, if bank 1 liquidates its bad old customers,
there is no longer an adverse selection problem between bank 1 and bank 2.I n
this case, there is perfect competition for the newly applying ﬁrms. Therefore,
bank 1 no longer makes a proﬁto u to fﬁnancing the new ﬁrms. Second, each bank
loses some rent from the good old customers. As the average repayment from the
newly applying ﬁrm decreases, the rent that can be extracted from the good old
ﬁrms decreases, too.
As an example for the bank’s liquidation decision, consider the payoﬀso fb a n k
2 provided that bank 1 does not intend to liquidate:
µs2 (1 − p)αA + µs2pΠ
GO (s1,s 2 =0 ) ≥ µs2pΠ
GO (s1,s 2)
or µs2 (1 − p)αA ≥ 0
11Bank 2 does not receive any proﬁt from the free market because by assumption
it has the lower market share. Moreover, its liquidation decision does not inﬂuence
the rent generated from the good old ﬁrms, i.e. ΠGO (s1,s 2 =0 )=ΠGO (s1,s 2).
Therefore, bank 2 will always liquidate its bad old ﬁrms. The following proposition
on the equilibrium liquidation decision is derived from the trade-oﬀ facing both
banks:
Proposition 3. The banks’ liquidation decisions depend on the payoﬀ obtained
from liquidating the ﬁrm’s assets.














































I,b a n k1 does not but bank 2 does
liquidate its bad old customers.































I, there are two pure strategy equilib-
ria:
(EQ1) bank 1 liquidates but bank 2 does not liquidate its bad old customers
(EQ2) bank 1 does not liquidate but bank 2 liquidates its bad old customers.












+ q(1 − µ)
 
,
both banks liquidate their bad old customers.
Proof: See the Appendix.
If the liquidation value is very low, bank 1 never liquidates its bad old cus-
tomers and therefore it is optimal for bank 2 to liquidate. If the liquidation value
is low, multiple equilibria occur. First, if bank 1 expects that bank 2 liquidates the
bad old ﬁrms, it prefers to keep its market power, which, in fact, even increases
by bank 2’s decision to liquidate. Second, if bank 1 expects that bank 2 does not
liquidate, it is optimal to liquidate. If the liquidation value is intermediate, bank
2 will always liquidate and the best response of bank 1 is not to liquidate. In the
case that the liquidation value is high, both banks have an incentive to liquidate
their bad old customers.
From a social welfare perspective, it is desirable that all bad old ﬁrms as
possible are liquidated. Thus, a situation in which only bank 1 liquidates, such as
equilibrium 1 in case 2, is preferable to one in which only bank 2 liquidates because
bank 1 has more bad old ﬁrms in its credit portfolio. The most desirable situation
is one in which both banks liquidate (case 3). The comparison between case 1
12and 2 is diﬃcult because there is a coordination problem in case 2. Suppose ﬁrst
that bank 1 expects bank 2 to liquidate its bad old ﬁrms. Then, bank 1 will not
decide to liquidate. Thus, the allocative result in both cases 1 and 2 is equivalent.
However, if bank 1 expects that bank 2 does not liquidate, it then decides to
liquidate; under these circumstances the allocation improves in case 2 compared
to case 1.
The following two propositions summarize how the equilibrium liquidation
decision is inﬂuenced by a parameter change.
Proposition 4. Suppose that in case 2 equilibrium 2 is obtained. Then the num-
ber of bad old ﬁrms liquidated (non-strictly) increases as the liquidation payoﬀ,
α, increases, as bank competition increases, i.e. s1 decreases, and as the adverse
selection problem decreases, i.e. µ and p decrease.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Better institutions increase the liquidation value and therefore provide better
incentives for liquidation. Moreover, if bank 1 has a lower market share, which
renders the banking sector more competitive, the terms of the credit contract are
more favorable for the customers, i.e. the expected repayment decreases. There-
fore, the rent extracted due to the hold-up decreases. The incentive for liquidation
is higher, the lower the rent extracted is. This reasoning also shows that the in-
centive for liquidation increases as the degree of asymmetric information between
banks is reduced. Thus, as the share of old borrowers decreases, µ, the liquidation
incentive increases. All other measures reducing asymmetric information, such as
the duty to provide information about defaulting customers to a public credit reg-
ister or better screening capabilities, improve the incentive for liquidation. As the
share of good old ﬁrms decreases, the liquidation incentives improve, too. Studied
in detail, a decrease in p has several eﬀects. First, the number of ﬁr m st h a ta r e
liquidated, and thus the liquidation value, increases. Second, the number of ﬁrms
that are held up decreases. Third, the rent extracted from the good old ﬁrms as
well as from the new ﬁrms increases. In total, the eﬀects of higher liquidation
proceeds and the lower number of ﬁrms that can be held up dominate the higher
rent extracted from the ﬁrms.
Interestingly, the decision to liquidate a ﬁrm is independent of the outstanding
debt, i.e. I1. The amount of credit granted in the ﬁrst period is comparable to
a sunk cost that no longer inﬂuences the bank’s decision. What the bank trades
oﬀ is the value of the two diﬀerent functions of bankruptcy - a payoﬀ generated
13for the lender and the dissemination of information. The advantage of keeping
information about incumbent ﬁrms private is expressed by the proﬁtc r e a t e df r o m
incumbent and new ﬁrms.
Proposition 5. Suppose that in case 2 only bank 1 liquidates its defaulting cus-
tomers, then the eﬀect of a higher liquidation value, α,o nt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms
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I, then the number of ﬁrms liq-
uidated (non-strictly) increases because both banks, instead merely of bank 1,
liquidate their bad old ﬁrms.
Proof: Compare conditions in Proposition 3.
The trajectory of the number of bad old ﬁrms liquidated is path-dependent
and not monotonic. Starting from a very low liquidation value (see case (i)),
where only bank 2 liquidates, an improvement of the institutions leads to a low
liquidation value, which, in turn, increases the number of ﬁrms liquidated. In the
l a t t e rc a s e( s e ec a s e( i i ) ) ,e x p e c t i n gt h a tb a n k2 does not liquidate, bank 1 has an
incentive to liquidate because bank 2’s decision leaves some rent to bank 1 from
the incumbent ﬁrms in addition to the liquidation payoﬀ. If institutions improve
further, leading to an intermediate liquidation value, bank 2 will always liquidate.
However, in the parameter range for intermediate liquidation values, bank 1 does
not have an incentive to liquidate if bank 2 liquidates because the rents lost from
incumbent and new ﬁrms cannot be compensated by the liquidation value. The
only condition under which both banks liquidate is that the liquidation value is
high (see case (iii)).
Even if some progress is made (low instead of very low liquidation value), a
further improvement of the institutions, which yields an intermediate liquidation
value, leads to lower allocative eﬃciency because the number of ﬁrms liquidated
decreases. However, if progress continues, the allocation of capital will improve
again.
14Similar results are obtained if the other parameters change marginally. How-
ever, the setback can be avoided if the change is not small but huge. This would
be the case if the adverse selection problem decreases drastically or institutions
improve signiﬁcantly. If it is possible to exclude all the bad old ﬁrms, the adverse
selection problem would disappear and the bank’s decision to liquidate would no
longer be distorted.
4. Conclusion and Discussion
Our analysis provides an explanation for the interdependence of institutions and
the number of bankruptcies. We have shown that the incentive to liquidate de-
faulting ﬁrms depends on the quality of institutions. They, in turn, determine
the payoﬀ a creditor gets from liquidating a ﬁrm. Therefore, our analysis further
explains why creditors in countries with deﬁcient institutions are passive. More-
over, another interesting result of our analysis is that, depending on the initial
conditions, better institutions might even decrease the number of bad old ﬁrms
liquidated. Even if there is no setback, it will take signiﬁcant changes until the
bankruptcy decision is made eﬃciently. The transition process in Eastern Europe
shows that the process of establishing institutions, which function reasonably well,
takes a long time, much longer than most experts expected at the beginning of
transition (Schnitzer, 2003).
The changes needed are the improvement of institutions and the reduction of
the adverse selection problem. With respect to our analysis, the main institution
that has to improve is the legal framework. The liquidation of a ﬁrm’s assets is
expensive from a social welfare point of view because seizing the assets is costly
and the secondary markets work ineﬃciently. The social loss will decrease if the
legal systems function better. Reform in two respects are necessary. Laws have to
be drafted more carefully in order to avoid ambiguities. Even more importantly,
the law enforcement must be faster and its results more predictable.11
The adverse selection problem between banks can be mitigated through several
measures. First, if the number of new ﬁrms in the credit market increases, neither
of the banks has information about the type of these ﬁrms. Decreasing the share
of borrowers for which the banks face the adverse selection problem decreases
the repayment and therefore the hold-up problem. Consequently, the incentive to
11Djankov et al. (2003) empirically analyze law enforcement through courts. The problems
of the bailiﬀs service in Russia are described by Kahn (2002).
15liquidate bad old ﬁrms increases. The necessary measures are to improve access
to credit for ﬁr m st h a th a v en o tb e e nﬁnanced by banks in the past. In countries
with a poor institutional environment, the degree of bank intermediation often
r e m a i n sr a t h e rl o w .A sas u b s t i t u t ef o rb a n k credit, informal credit arrangements
emerge. Measures that facilitate the ﬁrm’s access to bank ﬁnance include, for
instance, the establishment of agencies that assist ﬁrms in drafting business plans.
Second, the bank’s incentive to liquidate bad ﬁrms increases if the quality of
new ﬁrms improves. Third, improving the screening skills of the bank staﬀ also
reduces the possibility of incumbent banks to hold-up good old ﬁrms. Fourth,
bank competition should be fostered. This implies that the banks should have
similar market shares because the market structure of the banking sector matters
for the eﬀectiveness of the legal system. For countries that had to dissolve a
monopolistic (state) bank, such as the transition countries in Eastern Europe,
this implies that the carved out banks should be as similar as possible in terms
of market share and quality of the loan portfolio inherited.
Finally, public credit registers could potentially serve as a means to publish
information about ineﬃcient ﬁrms. Pagano and Jappelli (2000) observe that pub-
lic credit registries are more frequent in countries where law enforcement is less
eﬃcient and creditor rights are not very well protected. At least in theory, the
degree of adverse selection between banks decreases through credit registers, and
the incentive to liquidate ﬁrms increases. However, it is not obvious why banks
are willing to provide information about a ﬁrm. From our analysis it is clear that
they will not give information about a ﬁrm’s type if they are not compensated by
as u ﬃciently high liquidation payoﬀ. Alternatively, banks can simply be forced to
do so. But in countries with a poor legal environment, the legal commitment to
provide information should be rather diﬃcult to enforce and, therefore, it is easy
for the bank to act opportunistically. This may explain why public credit reg-
isters mostly contain information about defaults, arrears, loan exposure, interest
rates and guarantees but not information about the borrower’s type. Moreover,
they usually cover only a subset of borrowers, for example, those with relatively
large loans (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002). Consequently, the potential incentive
problem in revealing information to public credit registers and the informational
role of bankruptcy open new questions for research: Why do (private or public)
credit bureaus exists if information about the type of borrower are displayed by a
bankruptcy procedure? Are they mainly used for providing information about the
ﬁrms’ past outcomes, as predicted by Boukaert and Degryse (2002), in contrast
to their types?
165. Appendix
5.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1: We show that old customers stay with their incumbent bank.
• Bad old customers are denied credit by their incumbent bank because they
generate a payoﬀ of 0 <I.
• Due to the sequential nature of oﬀers, bank 1 underbids bank 2 marginally
(and vice versa) and keeps its good old ﬁrms, i.e. R1 = R2, because the old
ﬁrms have a slight preference for the incumbent bank.
Step 2: We show that no equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
R denotes the repayment that bank 2 needs for making zero expected proﬁt.
Suppose there exists a symmetric equilibrium with R1 = R2 >R .B a n k1 has
an incentive to marginally undercut R2 and still make a positive expected proﬁt.
Suppose that R1 = R2 = R.B a n k1 has an incentive to undercut bank 2 and still
make positive expected proﬁt. In this case, bank 2 would make an expected loss
and, thus, it would be better to make no oﬀer at all.
Suppose there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. Suppose
that R1 >R 2 >R .B a n k 1 has an incentive to marginally undercut bank 2
and make positive expected proﬁt. Suppose that R1 >R 2 = R.B a n k1 has an
incentive to undercut bank 2 and still make positive expected proﬁt. In this case,
bank 2 w o u l dm a k ea ne x p e c t e dl o s sa n d ,t h u s ,i tw o u l db eb e t t e rt om a k en oo ﬀer
at all. Suppose that R2 >R 1 ≥ R.B a n k2 has incentive to demand a marginally
lower repayment than bank 1 and make a non-negative proﬁt.
Step 3: We show that Fi (R) and Fj (R) are continuous and strictly monotonously
increasing on an interval (R,X).
Suppose that Fj is discontinuous at R∗, i.e. there exists an atom in Fj,t h e n
bank i’s action of playing R∗−  strictly dominates playing R∗+ ,   > 0. Therefore,
bank i will not bid a free-market repayment [R∗,R ∗ +  ). But then bank j can
raise its repayment without losing customers, so R∗ cannot be an optimal action
for bank j. Hence, Fj must be continuous.
Suppose that Fj is non-increasing over some interval, i.e. there exists an inter-
val (Ra,R b) ⊆ (R,X) for which fi (R)=0∀ R (Ra,R b).B u tt h e nprob(Ri <R j | Ri = Ra)=
17prob(Ri <R j | Ri (Ra,R b)), but proﬁts are strictly higher for Ri >R a (condi-
tional on winning), so that bank i maximizes its payoﬀ by playing Ri = Rb and
hence would never oﬀer a repayment in the interval. But then bank j can increase
its proﬁts by playing Rj = Rb −   with positive probability, where   <R b − Ra,
since this will lead to strictly higher proﬁts than any interest rate oﬀer in a neigh-
borhood of Ra. However, this contradicts the assumption that fi (R)=0∀
R (Ra,R b).
Step 4: We determine the equilibrium in mixed strategies as described in the
proposition.
Consider the proﬁtf u n c t i o no fb a n ki (i  = j and i =1 ,2) conditional on bank
j’s oﬀer.
Πi(Ri)=( 1− µ)(1− Fj (Ri))(qRi − I)+µsj (1 − p)(−I) ∀Ri [R,X).
Bank i will participate only if Πi(Ri) ≥ 0 or
lim
R→X (1 − Fj (R)) ≥
µsj (1 − p)
(1 − µ)(qRi − I)
I
T h e r ea r et w ow a y sf o rg e t t i n g lim
R→X (1 − Fj (R)) > 0:
• There is an atom at X in Fj. However, there cannot exist an atom in both
Fi and Fj since then neither Ri = X nor Rj = X would be optimal.
• Either bank i or bank j does not always bid on the free market. As shown
below, this has to be the smaller bank. This implies that its expected proﬁt
is zero because each oﬀer generates the same proﬁt.
Step 5: We determine the minimum repayment R. R is determined by the condi-
tion that bank 2 w i n st h ef r e em a r k e tw i t hc e r t a i n t y :
Π2(R)=( 1− µ)(qR− I)+µs1 (1 − p)(−I)=0
R =
(1 − µ)+µs1 (1 − p)
(1 − µ)q
I
Step 6: We determine bank 1’s expected proﬁt.
18Bank 1’s return for R is:
Π1(R)=( 1 − µ)(qR− I)+µs2 (1 − p)(−I)
=( s1 − s2)µ(1 − p)I ≡ Π1 > 0
Thus, it is shown that bank 2 d o e sn o ta l w a y sb i do nt h ef r e em a r k e ta n dt h e r e f o r e
makes zero expected proﬁt.
Step 7: We determine the mixing probabilities.
L e tu su s et h ef a c tt h a tΠ1(R1)=Π1 and Π2(R2)=0for each repayment.
• For bank 1 we determine F1(R) by setting
Π2(R2)=( 1− µ)(1− F1 (R2))(qR2 − I)+µs1 (1 − p)(−I)=0
Accordingly, F1 (R)=1−
µs1(1−p)









• For bank 2 we determine F2(R) by setting
Π1(R1)=( 1− µ)(1− F2 (R1))(qR1 − I)+µs2 (1 − p)(−I)=Π1
Accordingly, F2 (R)=1−
µs1(1−p)





.W i t hp r o b -
ability prob(D)=
µs1(1−p)
(1−µ)(qX−I)I bank 2 makes no oﬀer at all. Q.E.D.
5.2. Proof of Proposition 2
Each bank gets a rent from the good old ﬁrms, denoted by ΠGO
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(1 − p)+( 1− q)(1− µ)
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we assumed that (qX − I)(1− µ) >µ s 1I (1 − p). Q.E.D.
195.3. Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1: We study the liquidation incentive of each bank.
Bank 2: Let us ﬁrst study the incentive of bank 2 to liquidate its customers:
( 1 )P r o v i d e dt h a tb a n k1 intends to liquidate, bank 2 will liquidate if:














(1 − p)+( 1− q)(1− µ)
(1 − µ)q

















(2) Provided that bank 1 does not intend to liquidate, bank 2 will liquidate if:























(1 − p)+( 1− q)(1− µ)
(1 − µ)q
µps2I
or µ(1 − p)s2αA ≥ 0
Thus, if bank 1 does not intend to liquidate its bad old ﬁrms, bank 2 will
always liquidate its bad old ﬁrms too.
Bank 1: Let us study the incentive of bank 1 to liquidate its customers next:
( 3 )P r o v i d e dt h a tb a n k2 intends to liquidate, bank 1 will liquidate if:
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20(4) Provided that bank 2 does not intend to liquidate, bank 1 will liquidate if:
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Step 2: We compare the diﬀerent threshold values for the liquidation decision.
In order to determine the equilibrium liquidation decision, we have to compare
the diﬀerent threshold values of αA, where the liquidation decision changes.
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q(1−µ)s1 Is2 > 0



























































Step 3: We derive how the optimal liquidation decision depends on the liquidation
value.
The liquidation decision depends on the size of the liquidation value.

















the liquidation incentives are as follows:
21• Bank 2 liquidates its bad old ﬁrms if bank 1 does not intend to liquidate.
• Bank 2 does not liquidate its bad old ﬁrms if bank 1 intends to liquidate.
• Bank 1 never liquidates its bad old ﬁrms.
In equilibrium, bank 1 does not liquidate but bank 2 liquidates its bad old cus-
tomers.































I, the liquidation incentives are as
follows:
• Bank 2 liquidates its bad old ﬁrms if bank 1 does not intend to liquidate.
• Bank 2 does not liquidate its bad old ﬁrms if bank 1 intends to liquidate.
• Bank 1 liquidates its bad old ﬁrms if bank 2 does not intend to liquidate.
• Bank 1 does not liquidate its bad old ﬁrms if bank 2 intends to liquidate.
Thus, there are two pure strategy equilibria:
(EQ1) bank 1 liquidates but bank 2 does not liquidate its bad old customers
(EQ2) bank 1 does not liquidate but bank 2 liquidates its bad old customers.






























I, the liquidation incentives are as follows:
• Bank 2 always liquidates its bad old ﬁrms.
• Bank 1 liquidates its bad old ﬁrms if bank 2 does not intend to liquidate.
• Bank 1 does not liquidate its bad old ﬁrms if bank 2 intends to liquidate.
In equilibrium, bank 1 does not liquidate but bank 2 liquidates its bad old cus-
tomers.















the liquidation incentives are as follows:
• Bank 2 always liquidates its bad old ﬁrms.
• Bank 1 always liquidates its bad old ﬁrms.
In equilibrium, both banks liquidate their bad old customers. Q.E.D.
225.4. Proof of Proposition 4
The result of the comparative static analysis is that the threshold value above
which both banks decide to restructure is inﬂuenced by parameter changes as
follows. The threshold value















































q(1−µ)2 Ips1 > 0.








































that case (3), where both banks liquidate, is more likely if α increases. Q.E.D.
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